After some three months, Cuba could receive fuel again through Russia. Will Washington allow it?

Two tankers carrying Russian crude oil and derivatives that potentially have Cuba as their destination place even more spotlight on the Island, whose population is massively suffering the effects of an implacable escalation in the application of a 66-year-old U.S. sanctions regime. The Trump administration cut Venezuelan crude supply to Havana after the overthrow of Maduro—now imprisoned in New York—at the beginning of the year, and then threatened enough its neighbor, Mexico, another close ally of Cuba, to suspend its shipments as well. It later issued an executive order targeting with tariffs any nation eager to supply crude to Cuba. (After a Supreme Court ruling banning it for relying on the IEEPA, it had to eliminate this particular measure, while leaving the rest of the order in place.)

Although it has never been confirmed, the New York Times stated last month that, in practice, there is a formal naval blockade declaration to prevent fuel from entering Cuba, a country that is not self-sufficient, as it can only organically cover just about a third of its demand. Look, even during the first Trump administration, the White House allowed tankers from the so-called ghost/dark fleet—or generally designated—to feed the besieged Island. But in the prelude to the successful operation in Caracas on January 3, U.S. security forces actively turned to the seizure of tankers loaded with Venezuelan crude, thus enforcing a so-called "quarantine" that has hit harder here.

The Russian tankers and their uncertain destiny, holistically speaking

Now, how to assess Russia's move in this context? The first thing is to remember that it has been more than a year since it last sent crude to Cuba. The ideal would have been a prophylactic contribution, not an emergency one. Several things may be happening—or may have happened—here. For example, perhaps Putin de facto suspended crude shipments at Trump's behest, or he is managing his relations with the former Soviet ally from the strictest economic rationality, in part, and only in part, jeopardized by his conflict with Ukraine. This is concerning what happened. But what can happen with the Hong Kong-flagged Sea Horse and the Russian Anatoly Kolodkin, the former loaded with 200,000 barrels of diesel— which has described an erratic trajectory since late February—and the second with about 730,000 barrels of Urals crude, which are due to arrive at the beginning and end of next week, respectively?

It does not seem to me that Russia has launched itself into this adventure, which is in the world's spotlight, to be humiliated after a potential seizure at sea by US forces, but I do not rule out this variant, which would allow it to argue that it "at least tried" to support the Island with what it so urgently needs. But there could be a tacit consensus to let the vessels pass, even though Cuba has been directly vetoed from receiving the recently unsanctioned—at least for a month—Russian oil. Take into account that the Cuban state company in charge of fuel imports has been designated by the U.S. Treasury since 2019. Meanwhile, the people barely resist amid endless blackouts—many have to cook with charcoal and firewood—, runaway inflation, a steep decline in transportation and health services, and, in general, a painful erosion of life.

Source for the photo in the cover.