Marco Rubio suggests a way out for Cuba amid Trump-ordered oil siege

As always, statements from Trump administration officials must be consumed with great caution, especially when they address active conflicts with countries like Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba. In these cases, they often amount to psywar-like approaches and plain deception. This Saturday, during his stop in Munich, the head of Foggy Bottom made interesting statements about the White House's strategy towards (or against) Cuba, suggesting that if the Island's government commits to a process of transformation in its economic management, then Washington could relax the de facto oil blockade it has imposed as an extreme pressure measure; a measure that reinforces the intricate sanctions regime established during the first half of the 1960s to punish the then-emerging Cuban Revolution.

In this sense, I always find it very cynical when political actors like the Cuban-origin congresswoman María Elvira Salazar and Rubio avoid assessing the impact of the sanctions regime referred to, which is the most comprehensive that OFAC administers worldwide. And when I say it is the most complete, that could be interpreted very subjectively by setting its level of comprehensiveness on a scale of 1 to 10. In my judgment, it could be placed between 8.5 and 9. But the other important point here is to note that the second strongest sanctions regime—Russia, Iran, whatever you like—is quite far from these levels.

From his time in the Senate, Rubio likes the "argument" that Cuba can trade with the rest of the world, and now he also likes very much to label the Cuban government as "incompetent". But he knows perfectly well, maybe better than anyone, the practical impact of the Treasury's Cuban Assets Control Regulations on Cuba's ability to connect with an international economic-financial market where the United States has a very solid and historical incumbent position, with so much leverage; additionally, there is the deterrent effect that both the regulations and the discourse create on Cuba's potential international economic partners. Thus, it is quite unfair to limit analyses of Cuban reality to the state of the economy and its internal management—truly, widely reprehensible, especially in recent years—erasing the external variable.

"It is important for the people of Cuba to have more freedom – not just political freedom, but economic freedom," Rubio told Bloomberg. "Certainly their willingness to begin to make openings in this regard is one potential way forward," he stated in reference to Cuban top officials and the economic issue. Havana indeed had enough time to advance the necessary reforms or measures, not only economic but also political. In the latter case, there was (or is) the possibility of releasing prisoners who receive much attention being presented as political ones. Economically, the main points that even more or less allied countries like Vietnam or China make to the Cuban government are to open the economy more decisively to the private sector, and to ease regulations for foreign investment. But any move right now in these directions implies a capitulation.

There is an emergent hypothesis here: Cuba's intransigence in upholding its sovereignty is compromising the administration; id est: the issue is turning into a hot potato in its hands. Therefore, leaving things in the economic dimension could be an indication that expectations are being lowered, which must be very traumatic in Florida, given that, once again, many there have dreamed, perhaps more strongly than ever, of the end of the Cuban revolutionary process. They are already missing the USS Gerald Ford.