The Current State of Cuba's Comprehensive Crisis

Since this island connected to the world in the late fifteenth century—with Christopher Columbus's arrival on its shores—crisis has been a constant state. After nearly 400 years as a Spanish colony, its founding as a republic was shaped by U.S. influence on the country's political life—a drag on its independence—, chronic corruption, and bitter dictatorships like those of Gerardo Machado and Fulgencio Batista. After 1959, the Cuban Revolution compounded the many, very costly errors of its own making in every area that defines good statecraft with the critical impact of U.S. policy. Washington carved in stone the idea that it cannot coexist with a process like the one opened 90 miles to the south. It implemented the most comprehensive sanctions regime administered by the Treasury's OFAC, a fact the U.S. government itself acknowledges. Until the fall of the USSR, the blow of the U.S. economic war wasn't felt as strongly in Cuba, thanks to the generous exchange arrangements with the socialist bloc. Still, the first half of the last decade of the twentieth century was a harsh turning point for the Cuban economy. That moment, which brought an extreme worsening of the reproduction of material life—and, consequently, of spiritual life as well—went down in history as the "Special Period." Although by the year 2000 one might have thought the worst was over, the truth is that, for many, the country never fully recovered, and, officially, we never left the so-called "Special Period." I remember that around 2002 there was a major electrical crisis, in which you either had power in the morning and at night, or only in the afternoon. And of course, we'd take that crisis over this one any day.
So, back to the initial idea: which specific crisis am I referring to in the title? The one triggered by the first Trump administration in the first four months of 2019—though, to be thorough and leave nothing out, we could just as well set the starting point in 2017. Since then, between the assault on Cuban external sources of income like tourism and the export of professional services—regardless of the criticisms, some of them fair, leveled at each—and the pursuit of fuel imports, everything here has become much harder; far harder than it used to be. Because, again, in 2018 it was—and has never stopped being—hard to live, or survive, in Cuba. Still, it's crystal clear to anyone who puts their little gray cells to work, as Poirot would say, that people could cope better with that context, or with any other, even accounting for the "Special Period." Along the way, from 2019 to the present, there's the COVID-19 pandemic, the accumulation of restrictions Trump imposed along with those tied to the buildup of the sanctions regime—which, incidentally, dates back to 1960—and the unprecedented escalation of economic aggression that has followed the still murky removal of Nicolás Maduro this past January 3rd. So far this year, only one fuel tanker has arrived in Cuba—the Venezuelans have buckled under U.S. pressure, and certain high-ranking Cuban officials are beginning to show their discontent with that stance more openly—, and the humanitarian aid sent by countries like Mexico or China is nowhere near enough for the sheer scale of the crisis.
I have a friend who had to drop out of university in March because of fuel cuts. He came back this week having lost so much weight that I had to steel myself not to let my sorrow and shock show at such a stark example of what the reinforced economic strangulation policy of the second Trump administration is producing. There are, I repeat, plenty of errors and bad practices on the part of Cuba's political leadership, but for years we lived with all of that without the country digging itself quite this deep into misery and starvation. People in my hometown fetch water from the local river every day because the pumping system collapsed due to the fuel crisis. They can only count on three or four hours of power a day, or sometimes go two or three days without any at all. With no country willing to put its neck on the guillotine—to bleed, if need be—and stand as a bulwark against the White House, the Cuban government is rushing through a reform toward a market economy, but at the worst possible moment and burdened by the same chronic management problems I've already mentioned. The United States has said this isn't enough to ease the pressure, and it's holding out for deeper, specifically political reforms. But whether out of a defense of sovereignty or sheer self-preservation instinct, Cuba's leadership doesn't seem willing to hand over the concessions that the Rodríguez brothers' "Chavismo 3.0" has granted to Donald Trump. The problem is that my friend's body—just one instance of a national problem—can't keep waiting on politics. So, on the Cuban side, it grows more urgent by the hour to find common ground between two seemingly incompatible missions: keeping the country's dignity intact and delivering tangible results for those of us who are here. I don't know whether the current leadership can reach the level of statecraft needed to pull that off.
Source for the cover image, via X.

Realidad tan compleja...
... y subjetiva. Gracias por comentar.
Lo que contás del apagón de 2002 me hizo acordar a mi familia en La Habana, que decía lo mismo: que aquella crisis la firmaban con tal de no vivir la de ahora. Y eso que mencionás del turismo y los servicios profesionales como fuentes golpeadas es clave, porque sin esas entradas de divisas todo lo demás se desmorona en cadena.
Ese es el punto, amigo. Cualquier tiempo pasado fue mejor que el que estamos viviendo ahora. El cubano siempre se ha quejado, con razón, de que los ingresos no alcanzan, que "la vida está dura". Pero ya quisiéramos todos estar, por ejemplo, en septiembre de 2018. Que, obvio, la idea no es ir hacia atrás sino definitivamente dar un salto sustancial y representativo en la calidad de vida de la gente. Gracias por su interacción y la referencia a la visión familiar. Saludos desde La Habana.
El dato de 2019 como punto de quiebre con el turismo y la exportación de servicios médicos es clave. El mercado muestra que sin esas dos fuentes de divisas, la acumulación de reservas es prácticamente nula. ¿Ves algún soporte real en las remesas o en el sector privado incipiente para compensar ese volumen perdido?
Buenas tardes, un gusto responder a su interacción. Aunque era un mecanismo discutible, lo cierto es que mientras el Gobierno cubano era la interfaz para la recepción de remesas en la Isla, estas producían algún efecto derrame, más o menos representativo, para todos. Hoy no, a pesar de que sigue siendo altísimo, quizás mayor, el volumen de remesas que entra. Pero cursa a través de múltiples vías alternativas que el cubano fue creando para superar el bache producido por las sanciones que escalaron en 2019. O sea, el problema hoy no es que no sigan llegando remesas, sino que es despreciable en términos cuantitativos el volumen que el Gobierno maneja. El sector privado puede tener una participación más efectiva en la salida de la crisis, pero las autoridades deben aprender a gestionarlo mucho mejor, mucho mejor de lo que han hecho hasta ahora. No obstante, en última instancia es clave que la presión externa afloje. Saludos.