The Latin American Report # 586

The battle over the appropriations for the upcoming FY2026 will be quite tense, following the Solomon-like decision not to fight it in the one that is about to end in September—a typical dynamic of presidential transition years at the White House. In this sense, I have been following with special attention this time an issue that, however, has always attracted me as a researcher, related to the funds approved for political regime change in Cuba.

Generally, the Trump administration has proposed eliminating funding for democratic or development assistance. Classic accounts like the Economic Support Fund, the Democracy Fund, and the National Endowment for Democracy, have been zeroed in the Foggy Bottom's Congressional Budget Justification for FY2026. Instead, the Trump team is proposing the so-called America First Opportunity Fund, or A1OF, close to 3 billion dollars, intended to be more dynamic and finance those foreign operations in which there is "a clear, direct nexus to U.S. national interests."

Then, what interests me here is to measure the current power of Cuban-Americans, based in Florida but with significant political muscle in Congress and now in the State Department with Rubio at the helm. I want to see if the Cuban issue remains to be sensitive and sacred. To begin with, the New York Times reported in late June that Cuba was one of the countries where the most USAID programs had remained active after the first round of cuts by DOGE (73%).

Among the media outlets that retained some or all of its federal funding was Cubanet, historically backed by the NED, which even provided seed capital for its formation. Initially, the International Republican Institute, one of the four core bodies of the NED itself, and also historically very active in the Cuba democracy program, was approved to retain only 5% of its large State's DRL- and USAID-funded awards, but that marginal value comprised precisely projects related to Cuba and Venezuela. It must be remembered here that, obviously, these U.S. efforts are considered illegal, and therefore taken very seriously, by the Cuban authorities.

Thus, I am very interested in knowing specifically how much the administration will propose for this 1996-started Cuba democracy program, with $20 million being the amount that has regularly been requested annually since 2006. For the record, in its first Congressional Budget Justification, the first Trump administration zeroed it, but Congress reversed that decision.

The case of Radio Marti

But the note that really drew my attention to the issue today is this one from the Washington Post. It deals directly with a new round of layoffs at the USAGM, the parent agency of Radio Marti, a federal station, which has broadcast to Cuba for the last forty years. Initially, Trump's presidential order suspended the service for the first time, but it was later restored, though not at full strength.

In fact, Radio Marti is more a symbol of the Cuban (first) exile than a service with some impact or any representative audience. See here its reach via X for an argument backing my claim. Yet it is such a strong and necessary symbol that it seems to be challenging and so far resisting the economic rationality promoted from the Oval Office. All indications are that not a single employee of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, which administers Radio Marti, is targeted by the new order.

Although its potential funding for FY2026 is cut by just under half compared to the enacted level of the current one, the referred office is, by far, the one that suffers the least among all those under the supervision of the USAGM. The values destined for older and historical foreign communicative/propaganda efforts like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are completely zeroed. About the USAGM itself, there is some appropriation language proposed calling for its very closure. I will keep an eye on this interesting development.