Trump escalates his aggressive approach towards Venezuela; Cuba, 11 years after 17D; EU-MERCOSUR free trade agreement in suspense

Approximately at the same moment I was publishing the issue # 675 of this report, Donald Trump took a new, unusual step in his onslaught against the government of Nicolás Maduro, which he does not recognize. This time, it is no longer just about propagating the narrative that the so-called Cartel de los Soles, a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the murky standards of Foggy Bottom and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by those of the Treasury Department, is directed from Miraflores itself. The Trump administration claims that this "cartel", in alliance with the Tren de Aragua—another allegedly Maduro-related group, also designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist—and even the Sinaloa Cartel, is "responsible for terrorist violence throughout our hemisphere as well as for trafficking drugs into the United States and Europe."

If this was not enough "argument" to, in practice, declare the de facto Venezuelan government as an outlaw, Trump designated it last night, via Truth Social—the level of legal applicability of this is not clear to me—as a Foreign Terrorist Organization as well. The most concerning here is that he is imposing, in another display of naked realism in the realm of international relations, "a total and complete blockade of all sanctioned oil tankers going into, and out of, Venezuela". In a search I performed today on the SDN List, 62 vessels appear directly listed there as part of the sanctions programs specifically targeting Venezuela, which date back to the first Trump administration. But Trump talks about "all sanctioned oil tankers", which would open the range to any sanctioned tanker, generally associated with the so-called dark fleet transporting crude and derivates from (or to) sanctioned countries, like Cuba in the last case.

Trump appealed, again, to low-stature legal arguments. But low-stature are also those configuring the "rationale" for the military buildup in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, and yet Hegseth continues to mortally pierce—with his "spear"—South American civilians who hardly qualify as combatants engaged in armed conflict, although I can accept that the 95 victims so far of the September-started attacks are very likely involved in drug trafficking. Thus, according to Axios, about 20 tankers lie right now, with some 9 millions barrels of crude, within Venezuelan waters, eight of them of the same category as the Skipper seized last week. Trump's very threatening announcement from last night only confirms reports from Reuters, Axios, and other media, which have been claiming for days that the United States is ready to carry out more seizures. In total, some 40 vessels targeted by the OFAC are currently in Venezuelan waters, while it is estimated that 11 million barrels of crude "are waiting to be shipped." The entry of critical Russian naphtha may be also affected by Trump's mere announcement.

In another wire, Reuters journalist Marianna Parraga claims that some tankers that originally had some Venezuelan port as destination have turned around, including some loaded with Russian naphtha, and that only the Houston-based, and OFAC-licensed Chevron operates its shipments normally since the last week. Even an unsanctioned tanker that sailed recently did so in "dark mode" with the same amount seized from the Skipper, some 1.8 million barrels.

What will finally happen there?

Despite congressional pressure over the attacks and the whole deployment, in which Republicans no longer seem so involved, Trump continues spending thousands of dollars per minute to sustain his aggresive approach, without concrete results in what, increasingly, appears to be his ultimate goals beyond a large anti-drug, life-saving operation: oil and regime change. John Bolton, and yesterday Graham, somehow have provoked the administration in the sense that if, at the end, it does not manage to overthrow Maduro, it will be very difficult to justify the expense and all the drama.

Meanwhile, the Federal Aviation Administration again advises air operators to exercise caution when flying over the Maiquetia Flight Information Region, a psychological warfare-type maneuver that has resulted in a significant loss of air (and economic) activity in Venezuela. In this sense, the main disturbances seem to have come from the US deployment itself.

Cuba

This December 17 marks 11 years since the historic moment when, simultaneously, Raúl Castro and Barack Obama announced a path to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana, and, in general, a roadmap to achieve some modus vivendi beneficial to both. Obama even traveled to Havana in March 2016 and ordered substantial, positive changes in OFAC sanctions policy. But the latter lasted, at most, three years, as the first Trump administration, with John Bolton coordinating national security in the West Wing, activated "maximum pressure" measures to punish Havana for its alleged support of Maduro. This very targeted approach, which the Biden administration, in essence, enforced, is at the base of the humongous crisis the Island experiences today, reinforced in the last quarter by a complex dengue and chikungunya epidemic and the impact of Hurricane Melissa.

EU/MERCOSUR FTA

Germany remains firm in its support for the conclusion of the trade agreement between the European Union and MERCOSUR, which Italy and France oppose. "The EU's capacity for action is also measured by whether, after 26 years of negotiations, we are finally capable of concluding the trade agreement," declared German Chancellor Friedrich Merz this Wednesday. Meloni says it is "premature" to sign the agreement right now, while French President Emmanuel Macron, working to set a new, 2026 deadline for its activation, assured he would oppose it "very firmly" if the bloc's critical institutions attempt to "impose it" this week.

Lula says that if there is no triumphal signing of the long-negotiated agreement this Saturday in the southern Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu, during the MERCOSUR semi-annual summit, the European bloc will have missed the last train, at least while he is in the Palácio do Planalto. Thus, he is urging Macron and Meloni to concede. The French agricultural sector continues to protest very aggressively against this pact and other issues. Meanwhile, in Paraguay, whose government will assume the rotating presidency of MERCOSUR at the referred summit, it is being discussed whether the increase in meat exports is pushing up prices in the domestic market.

Ecuador

In Portoviejo, capital of the coastal province of Manabí, a new massacre with seven dead as the final toll was reported. "There are signs of torture and they were tied up[;] they also have gunshots to the head," declared the Police commander in the Manabí sub-zone. This is the 21st massacre in Portoviejo, the second most violent district in Manabí, according to information from the local media Primicias cited by EFE. The infamous first place is held by Manta, where, with support from the US Air Force, the Ecuadorian government has activated a "temporary operation" aimed at "identifying and dismantling drug trafficking routes," according to what the head of Carondelet stated.

Until 2009, a US military base was installed in Manta, whose old infrastructure was assessed firsthand by US Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem during a visit in early November. President Daniel Noboa intended through a referendum to eliminate the constitutional prohibition on that type of foreign installations on Ecuadorian soil, but his proposal was widely rejected.

This is all for today’s report.