Trump withdraws tariff threat against Cuba after harsh Supreme Court ruling

Among the executive orders that can no longer rely on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose additional ad valorem duties on American imports of foreign goods is the one introduced at the end of January by Trump, declaring Cuba "an unusual and extraordinary threat" to U.S. national security. In truth, that executive action—aimed at threatening with tariffs countries "directly or indirectly [selling] or otherwise [providing] any oil to Cuba"—, was meant to crown the aggressive tracking of crude shipments to Cuba initiated by Trump himself during his first administration, and extraordinarily reinforced since last December in the context of the policy towards Venezuela, which was also at the base of that first attack about six years ago.

In practice, Cuba's oil sources had long been reduced to Venezuela and Mexico. With the former out of play since December, the Aztecs remained, but even before the aforementioned executive order came into effect, Claudia Sheinbaum's government was already deciding to suspend crude shipments to Havana, succumbing to Washington's more or less public threats. Thus, the withdrawal of the tariff threat would have no impact, because the clear thing here is that Mexico does not want to upset Trump, limiting itself to sending humanitarian aid other than oil, as Uruguay is also considering doing.

And what about Russia?

Russian supplies are so sporadic that they represent less than 4% of Cuba's total daily needs, or less than 0.1% of the daily export volume of the Eurasian giant. The last shipment was precisely in February last year, amounting to more than 730,000 barrels. According to Bloomberg, the vessel Sea Horse would be heading to Cuba with around 200,000 barrels, with its arrival scheduled for the first days of March. This would equate to less than two days of Cuban crude demand, without it being clear yet whether the unsanctioned tanker is actually heading to Cuba or not, the shipment's volume, or whether the Trump administration will intercept it, in this case not so much because of the tariff threat but because it transports "sanctioned" Russian crude; if the Cuban buyer is the company Cubametales, it is also sanctioned.

According to The New York Times, the U.S. Coast Guard is already enforcing a plain, unannounced official blockade around Cuba, after the interception of a tanker—the Ocean Mariner—with some 84,600 barrels of Colombian fuel oil last week that was supposedly heading to the Island. "If they come to apply a total blockade, Cuba will have plans and resources to face it," the permanent representative of Cuba to the United Nations assured the Spanish agency EFE. In the context of the tariff threat, Moscow had been reluctant to generate problems with the Americans, although the Kremlin spokesperson had also said that the current level of trade between the two powers, as a result of Western sanctions themselves, was negligible.

The Miami connection

Another hypothesis to rule out would be if the Sea Horse's voyage has been agreed upon by all three parties, which would, incidentally, confirm that there is some dialogue between the Cubans and the White House. The content and final objectives of this alleged exchange between Marco Rubio and some more or less official but influential actor of the Cuban leadership are the subject of much controversy in Florida, a state housing the hard core of the so-called "Cuban exile." The representatives of this group on Capitol Hill categorically reject any final deal that does not imply the end of the Cuban communist political regime, and, in fact, they have very hastily already signed its death certificate. They run a great political risk by betting on the erratic and pragmatic Donald Trump—the Cuban-origin, Foggy Bottom's head Marco Rubio is obliged to be also to survive—, and, furthermore, I believe they are miscalculating a lot what the country can endure even amidst these circumstances of blockade and almost zero external income. They play all or nothing against a Cuba that has certain diplomatic caché and on occasions can move its political waist.

It has already been over two months since the country, in practice, has not received fuel from abroad—except for a very small shipment from Mexico on January 9th—, so some credit must be given to the Cuban authorities for keeping it alive at least, albeit in a certainly depressing state of socioeconomic health—which hits hard, above all, the common citizen. The situation is so serious that even a rare riot took place in a prison from the center of the country. Among the immediate actions that these Cuban-American, hawkish politicians in Washington are demanding is the prosecution of the old Cuban leader Raúl Castro for the shooting down 30 years ago of two U.S.-registered private civil aircraft—it was always very disputed whether inside or outside Cuban airspace—, which resulted in the death of three U.S. citizens and one resident. But maybe they are dreaming too high if they think that the United States could seize Castro as they did with Maduro last January 3rd; it is very difficult for the old combatant to let himself be captured alive, especially since he is on notice. Furthermore, Castro formally holds no position in the Cuban government structure.

The people's crisis 👇

This is all for today's report.