The Latin American Report # 692

One of the issues I have been following with the most interest in recent months should be defined by these days: the approval of the appropriations' legislation for the State Department. The main signals I am looking for here are how democracy programs would fare compared to the last regular legislation, passed in 2024—last year was run in CR mode—, and particularly whether the configuration of the Cuba democracy program, initiated by the—now indeed, defunct—USAID in 1996, would be explicitly outlined, amid a very disruptive reform of U.S. foreign policy marked by big spending cuts.

To start, a relevant point is that, under the clear influence of the Cuban-origin representative Mario Díaz-Balart, Vice Chair of the powerful House Committee on Appropriations, and specifically Chairman of its further critical National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Subcommittee—funding Foggy Bottom—, many Republicans rejected the total abandonment proposed by the administration regarding so-called "democracy promotion," which for me is nothing more than the conduct, by the U.S. foreign policy apparatus—in broad daylight in some cases, and in others, not so much or not at all—of covert/clandestine regime change activities that were always the CIA's responsibility.

In its Congressional Budget Justification for fiscal year 2026, Marco Rubio's State Department zeroed out classical accounts like Economic Support Fund, Development Assistance, Democracy Fund, and Transition Initiatives, and even proposed to fully defund the controversial National Endowment for Democracy. Instead, the corresponding legislation already cleared by the House about two weeks ago—and now awaiting the decision of the Republican leadership on whether to merge it or not with the contentious case of funding for the turbulent Kristi Noem-led agency—introduces a new account, "National Security Investment Programs," which "consolidates bilateral economic assistance accounts funded in prior [appropriations acts]," although the Democracy Fund account remains independent. Furthermore, the NED retains its funding.

However, regarding "democracy programs," there is indeed a 25% reduction compared to the level enacted in 2024. Part of the sum allocated for these regime change programs will come, naturally, from the newly introduced National Security Investment Programs account, and will fund the referred Cuba democracy program at the levels that Díaz-Balart has been defending from his influential position—25 million dollars, not counting the 30 million planned for the U.S. Agency for Global Media's Office of Cuba Broadcasting—. Thus, this last fact demonstrates the strength of Cuban interests within Capitol Hill, especially with a Rubio who is increasingly empowered in the Republican establishment against some initial odds. By the way, there is agreement with the White House to move forward with the approval of this legislation if it reaches the Resolute desk. Democracy programming in Venezuela is also projected at the same levels as 2024, that is: 50 million dollars.

Trump and Venezuela

There is some rapport here 👇?

This is all for today’s report.